

Care of Death: On the Teaching of Reiner Schürmann

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ABSTRACT: A homage in the guise of an essay, this is the story of the last course Reiner Schürmann taught. As a text, it attempts to describe, situate, and come to terms with the power of Schürmann's teaching in the context of his last lectures on Heidegger's *Being and Time*. But if it is to be true to the deepest lessons of Schürmann's thinking, it will also need to be heard as an invitation to interpret together the significance of his reading so that it may be permitted to shape the course of the lives of those who encounter it.

KEY WORDS: Schürmann, Heidegger, Plato, teaching

In the *Phaedo*, Socrates makes Simmias laugh when he suggests that “those who happen to have gotten in touch with philosophy in the right way devote (*epitēdeuō*) themselves to nothing else but dying and being dead.”¹ Simmias himself admits that he is not much for laughing; yet he found himself somehow there laughing as he attended to Socrates in his prison cell on the prescribed day of his death.

Of course, that's how it was with Socrates, always putting those he encountered in touch with something they had not expected of themselves or of the world they inhabited.

Reassuring his friend, Socrates goes on to suggest that it would be laughable if someone who had lived a life devoted to death would, when death itself was at hand, be aggrieved. “In fact, Simmias,” Socrates goes on to say, “those who philosophize rightly make dying their care (*melataō*).”²

Socrates is here playing with words in a poignant and provocative way: the verb *melataō* means both take thought or care of something, but also, to pursue or practice. Indeed, as it resonates with the practice of devotion (*epitēdeuō*) that had provoked laughter in Simmias at the beginning, the idea that philosophy, when

rightly pursued, is the careful practice of dying begins to seem less ridiculous and more descriptive of the devoted practices of Socrates' life and of the way he intended to practice his death in those final hours. It is a fitting start to a dialogue that performs beautifully the argument for which it advocates.³

We don't generally attend carefully enough to the manner in which those who practice philosophy put their philosophical commitments into practice. Yet, in some deep sense, Plato puts these words into the mouth of Socrates in the *Phaedo* precisely to show the performative consistency between Socrates' life and his thinking, his deeds and his words. Plato, for his part, seems to have dedicated his life to putting words to the practices of Socratic philosophy in dialogues that might motivate others to consider undertaking the careful practices of philosophy. The dialogues, inspired by Socrates, were written in ways that inspire those who encounter them to pursue philosophy as a living practice. In this sense, the dialogues are eloquent testimony to the transformative power of teaching.

Teaching here, however, is decidedly not a question of indoctrination. To the contrary, indoctrination is the opposite of genuine pedagogical practice. When Socrates makes Simmias laugh, he leads him to a moment of self-reflection that invites him to be present to the moment in a way he might not otherwise have been. Great teaching attunes us to what discloses itself, to the unfolding of life and thus also to the death that constitutes life as its limit. We encounter Socrates teaching until the very end, and caring for those he taught in the very manner in which he died.

In the spring of 1993, Reiner Schürmann taught Philosophy 261: Heidegger's *Being and Time* as a huge lecture course. He knew it would be his last. He had asked me to be one among a number of graduate teaching assistants for that course, which packed the auditorium on the first floor of the Graduate Faculty building on 5th Ave between 13th and 14th streets in New York City. To be a teaching assistant for him that semester, for that course, was a daunting task—we all knew that our teacher was dying of AIDS and that this would likely be the last opportunity we would have to learn from him in the classroom. What we learned that semester, however, extends far beyond anything that was said during those compelling lectures; for what unfolded in the reading Schürmann offered and in his graceful ways of inviting us to enter into dialogue with the text even as his finitude pressed itself upon him, continues to fold itself into the lives of each one of us who encountered Schürmann as a teacher.

It was standing room only on February 3, 1993, if my notes from the class are reliable. We had come to hear Schürmann engage in a deep reading of a book that meant so much to so many of us in part at least because it meant so much to him. When Schürmann taught, he lectured in the original sense of the term: he offered a reading (*legere*) and invited us to read along with him. His readings,

whether of Heidegger or Nietzsche, Kant or Luther, Eckhart or Plotinus, Plato or Parmenides, were always provocative and compelling.

“Our starting point,” writes Schürmann in an early essay entitled “Symbolic Difference,” “shall be the privileged experience of understanding we have in reading a text. What befalls someone who is compelled to enter into this hermeneutical relation, reading a document written in a language whose signifiers are understandable to them through their culture?”⁴

The answer, he provides moments later: “to read is to interpret, to interpret is to exist in a new way. The hermeneutical relation concerns our reality, for the text interprets us.”⁵

The hermeneutic compulsion of which Schürmann writes here drew us to the auditorium that semester; and, aside perhaps from the *Phaedo* itself, it would be difficult to imagine a more poignant text to interpret us that spring than *Being and Time*. Indeed, the reading Schürmann offered was animated by a situated attunement to the existential conditions under which human life inhabits the world and by what a resolute and authentic openness to them might yet make possible. It was, in short, animated by an attuned understanding of the Heideggerian text in the Heideggerian sense. As equi-original structures of human being-in-the-world, attunement and understanding condition all hermeneutical encounter; but it was made explicit in Schürmann’s lectures early that spring, lectures that were, like the text on which they focused, destined to remain incomplete.⁶

We might indeed begin here at the end, reversing Schürmann’s own tendency to tarry with the question of beginning; for although he himself began that semester with a bold and nuanced reading of the introduction of *Being and Time* in order to orient us properly to the way that enigmatic text provokes us to take up the question of Being as a task, attending here at the beginning to where Schürmann’s reading broke off will allow us to find our way back to a central teaching of philosophy and enable us to discern again something of the power of Schürmann’s teaching.

THE HEURISTICS OF DYSFUNCTION

By April 14, 1993, Schürmann had led us to the very place where *Being and Time* comes into contact with its own limits even as it articulates the deepest ontological structure of Dasein. Throughout the semester, Schürmann had been circling around the temporality of Dasein, following the spiraling path along which the ontological analytic of Dasein unfolds in *Being and Time*. That path moves from the surface to the depth, mimicking the method of Aristotle in the first book of the *Physics*, as it progressively uncovers the ontological structure of Dasein first in terms of our being-in-the-world, then according to care (*Sorge*), the existential manner in which we are always already attuned to the world we inhabit, and now,

finally in §§48–50, in terms of time.⁷ In these sections, the ontological analytic of Dasein attains its deepest existential articulation as it reveals the temporal structure of Dasein itself. They mark too, however, the limits of *Being and Time*; for our encounter with the temporal structure of Dasein points to a longer path of thinking and action that would need to be undertaken in order to properly understand Being as time. Heidegger had, of course, pointed us in this direction in the introduction, and Schürmann had been careful to chart this course for us at the beginning of the semester.⁸ We were, here in his final session, being asked to return to the beginning, precisely as Schürmann's own thinking again and again required of itself. And yet, that day, without fully realizing it, we were being asked to return to the beginning again without him, and invited to pursue the question of being, as he had, by undertaking the practice of philosophy as a kind of devoted care of death.

The session began, in an irony that was palpable for us at the time, at the moment where the analytic of Dasein requires us to consider the existential structure of being-toward-death. Schürmann had prepared us well for the moment because he had, earlier in the semester, developed an account of the “heuristics of dysfunction” in relation to the famous analysis in *Being and Time* of the hammer which reveals its being precisely when it fails to be capable of performing its function.⁹ Schürmann had, in that context, emphasized how what is ready-to-hand (*zuhanden*) presents itself in a new way when it fails to operate in the manner in which we'd come to expect. In breaking down, the hammer becomes objectively present (*vorhanden*) to us as we come to encounter a dimension of its being that had remained opaque so long as it continued to do what we expected of it. The heuristics of dysfunction does not reveal a new being to us, but rather, it uncovers a deeper dimension of the being with which we had long thought ourselves familiar.¹⁰ As Schürmann put it, “dysfunction reveals a function.”¹¹

So too, now, in §§48–50, we were asked to consider the heuristics of dysfunction in relation to the being of Dasein itself, a task that asks more of us than we are capable of accomplishing. However, in attending to Schürmann as he pursued this reading of the text and attempted to perform it properly in life, we came perhaps closer to an attuned understanding of being-toward-death in its concreteness than any of us expected.

The three dimensions of being-toward-death with which Schürmann began that session, following the text, discloses death as 1) my ownmost possibility, 2) non-relational, and 3) not to be outstripped.¹² The reading Schürmann offered that day performed in a remarkable way precisely what the text itself requires of each of us: to orient ourselves toward our own death in a way that refuses to allow death to remain abstract and distant. If these three dimensions of being-toward-death are designed to singularize us by bringing us face to face with our

own finitude so as to uncover the temporal structure of human existence itself, that day Schürmann put the teaching of the text into practice.

As my *ownmost* possibility, death is a potentiality that is always *mine*. Here the notion of authenticity is concretized, for what is *eigentlich* in Heidegger, is what is my own (*eigen*). The existential structure of being-toward-death throws me back upon myself. A proper orientation toward death can never be determined according to a “they.” “They” do not die, I do. Thus, this first dimension of being-toward-death requires each of us to recognize death as always my own. Death is always *my* possibility.

As a *possibility*, being-toward-death uncovers the fore-structure of Dasein. Death always already conditions my being-in-the-world whether I attend to it or not. Yet, in attending to the existential structure of being-toward-death, I am also singularized, wrenched from the network of relationships with which I am also always involved. Schürmann put it this way: “Death is the initial breach from the everyday realm of common sense.”¹³ It directs us not to the world we inhabit, but it pulls me back toward myself. Here, the non-relational dimension of being-toward-death begins to make itself felt: death is not something someone else can undertake for me, nor can it be experienced in the way we all lived through the death of our teacher. Death singularizes.

That death is, third, not to be outstripped indicates the degree to which we have come to encounter a limit in relation to which there is nothing more encompassing. Death is an ultimate that can neither be circumvented nor denied; death can only be anticipated. Being-towards-death reveals the futurity of Dasein’s *ek-sistence*. Schürmann designated the being of Dasein as “*ek-sistence*” in order to emphasize the way Dasein, in its being, is always ahead of itself. The hyphen was designed to gesture to the transcendence of Dasein, the manner in which it stands out of itself in anticipation of its death-to-come.¹⁴

Yet, encountering death as being-toward-death opens me also to a way of living together with others that makes dying my care; it opens us to a practice of philosophy in the Socratic spirit, one that refuses to remain on the surface of things, but rather, devotes itself to deepening our understanding of ourselves and the world we inhabit even as we stand out towards our ownmost potentiality for being, non-relational, and not to be outstripped.

Heidegger called this way of being, authenticity (*Eigentlichkeit*), a manner of being proper to Dasein, and put into practice by singular figures willing to stand outside of themselves toward their own death in ways that empower them to enrich the lives of those they encounter here. Schürmann captured the signature of the heuristic dysfunction of death when he said “it ‘owns up’ to the whole of existence from birth to death.”¹⁵ In this, death holds life accountable to itself, pulling each of us toward a limit that requires us to return to one another more deeply attuned to the temporality that conditions our being-in-the-world.

Here, however, we come up against the limits of *Being and Time* in two connected ways. Internally to the project of the text, as Dasein reveals its temporal structure, we are called back to the deeper question of Being with which the book begins. The question of Being, which had been retrieved at the inception of the book, had been pursued through an investigation into the being of Dasein. Dasein, in disclosing its temporality, points to a longer road that will require us to think Being itself in terms of time. Schürmann had gestured to this longer road at the beginning of his lectures when he argued for a holistic reading of Heidegger's work in which the trajectory of the question of Being, *the question that occupied Heidegger from beginning to end*, sets us on an itinerary that begins with *Being and Time*, continues through the so-called "turn," and leads ultimately to the last published lectures of Heidegger's life entitled *On Time and Being* which itself continues the attempt to think Being as time.¹⁶

By calling attention to the course of Heidegger's life and the question that animated it, we come up against another limit of *Being and Time*, namely, the degree to which it remains still too focused on the structures of the self and, more specifically, on an understanding of authenticity that fails to return us to the world we inhabit with others. The pursuit of the question of the being of Dasein leads us in a progressively deepening movement to an encounter with our own death that can, although it need not, impoverish our relationships with those we encounter in the world.

This limitation of *Being and Time* was redressed to some degree in the performance of the reading Schürmann offered us in the spring of 1993. To discern this, it will be necessary to attend to the final point over which Schürmann tarried during that final session. It was the question of Being-with, and specifically, Being-with as it attends to the presencing of beings.

THE PRESENCING OF BEINGS

Having disclosed the futurity of Dasein through an analysis of being-towards-death, Schürmann turned our attention to the equi-original structures of the temporality of Dasein: projection, thrownness, and Being-with. In projection, as we have heard, Dasein authentically "lets itself come towards itself," as Schürmann put it that day.¹⁷ In this, we connect "*Eigentlichkeit*"—what is properly one's own—to "*Erschlossenheit*"—openness—in a way that draws our attention to the manner in which we might comport ourselves authentically to the beings we encounter. Schürmann thus gestures toward a way of responding to what presents itself rooted ontologically in the very temporality of Dasein, a response that refuses to allow itself to become absorbed in an inauthentic obsession with death as one's ownmost potentiality. Although the non-relational character of authentic being-towards-death requires us to recognize death as singularizing,

when this futurity of Dasein is reintegrated into a more holistic understanding of ek-sistential temporality, it reveals itself as a kind of openness that might be the basis of more authentic relationships with others.

This suggestion was amplified in that last lecture by Schürmann's account of thrownness, the second of the three ek-stasies of time which Schürmann thematizes as the "sense of Care." Here, "sense" points to the complex intertwining of past, present, and future. Schürmann reminds us that "the originary unity of the structure of care lies in temporality." Indeed, he is careful here to insist on the equi-originality of past, present, and future even if the pull of death endemic to the ek-static future has a heuristic priority in revealing the temporality of Dasein.¹⁸ Yet, for Schürmann, the sense of sense (*Sinn*) is that it points to the dynamic possibilities of being. Thus, the directionality of the term "*Sinn*," which almost cannot be articulated without a demonstrative gesture, is proper to a being whose being is temporal. To speak of temporality as the "sense of Care" is to point to the possibilities endemic to the play of all three ek-stasies of the temporality of Dasein.

Thus, thrownness, which had characterized the facticity of Dasein's being-in-the-world, is here heard to gesture to a certain having-being as always already my own. The historicity of Dasein here comes to expression; authentic Dasein must recognize itself as having-been. The past is not, of course, over and done, but always at work in the existential structure of the being of Dasein itself. If being-towards-death orients me to my ownmost possibility to come, thrownness requires me to recognize that what has been too is a persisting and living dimension of my ongoing ek-sistance. Indeed, even now in writing and reflecting on the living presence of Reiner Schürmann and on the legacy of his teaching on my life as it continues to unfold, this dimension of my own having-been is made palpable.

Ek-static temporality makes itself felt in this sense of care for what has come before, for my ownmost possibility, and now, finally, for my openness to what comes to presence. This was, indeed, where the lecture ended, with a kind of injunction to let beings presence. Schürmann thematized this, following Heidegger, as Being-alongside-with, *Sein-bei*.¹⁹ This is the authentic sense of care that marks the temporality of the present, and it requires of each of us a capacity to allow things to come to presence as they are, and to tarry with them in their very presencing.

It would be difficult to imagine a more proper place for that final lecture to come to an end. Schürmann was concerned with precisely how to be present in authentic ways and specifically with modes of disclosedness that let beings be.

MOMENTS OF ENCOUNTER

These were the very concerns that had animated his own desire to arrange a meeting with Martin Heidegger twenty-seven years earlier. In 1966, a 24-year-

old Schürmann studying in Freiburg wrote to Heidegger to request an in-person meeting to address two questions. The first concerned Meister Eckhart's attempt to "think being as self-sending." Attuned to the manner in which being shows itself, Schürmann wondered if being was "only eventfully experienceable." The second too concerned the site of the encounter with being, and specifically whether "the mystery of the gift could be experienced as the mystery of the 'thou,' without thinking's having to fall into representation."²⁰

These two questions suggest the degree to which Schürmann's thinking remained deeply concerned with how we might properly respond to the coming to presence of being. It is also not without significance that Schürmann sought a face to face dialogue with Heidegger on these two questions, questions that invite us to consider more fully how to be-alongside-with what comes to presence. He sought, in short, an opportunity to be-alongside Heidegger as he responded to such essential questions, just as we, twenty-seven years later, sought to be-alongside Schürmann as he responded to the questions *Being and Time* asks of us.

Schürmann's own account of the encounter, written in a letter to an unknown correspondent on the very day it happened, March 11, 1966, captures something significant about what it means to devote one's life to the practice of philosophy as care of death.

Reading the letter now, it is difficult not to transfer all the eager excitement, trepidation, and respect Schürmann ascribes to his encounter with Heidegger to our encounters with Schürmann as a teacher. He begins by announcing that "the event that I awaited eagerly and with stage-fright has just taken place."²¹ Anyone who has given a presentation in a Schürmann course or written a paper for him understands the stage-fright of which Schürmann himself speaks here. Schürmann could be a daunting figure. We would often share stories with one another about how, for example, he would pull his glasses down to the end of his nose, and, looking over them, admonish a student: "this is a perfect example of how *not* to give a presentation;" or how he had once written in the margins of a paper a student had written completely in aphorisms: "this is not philosophy." Leveraging shame and fear in this way is not a pedagogical practice to be emulated, but it had profound motivating effects. We worked hard to live up to the standards he required of himself and of us; he was a model of the kind of scholarship we each wanted to practice.

However daunting he may have at times been, he also embodied himself what he said of Heidegger: "the man is so shrewd, and, above all, he has such a listening ability (in this respect, I have never met anyone as heedful of what one says) that it felt like my meager schoolboy questions were received by warm and reassuring hands."²² Schürmann too had such reassuring hands, and he was generous in using them to lead us along paths of thinking and acting we did not at first discern, and then, once discerned, did not think were possible to traverse.

Once when he came across me, deflated after receiving a lower grade than I had hoped on a mid-term paper I had written for him on Plotinus, he sat down next to me and asked what was bothering me. He was tired then, battling AIDS, and yet, still generous with his time, attuned to his students, and tender in his response. Two things I carry with me from that conversation: first, reconstructive readings are the condition for the possibility of excellence in philosophy, but they are not sufficient—you must be creative; and second, he was confident in my capacity to put that creativity into practice in a philosophical life. I return to that conversation frequently—and to the manner in which he was there with me in the moment—as to a wellspring that has served as a touchstone. This was being-with in its deepest ontological sense, laden by what has-been, pulled by what would come, and yet there, listening and responding with reassuring hands.

I wonder if that March 1966 conversation with Heidegger in Friburg as the darkness of evening descended might have been for Schürmann and his life what his encounter with me that day was for me and mine: a moment that set one on a course, an encounter that helped to animate a life, giving it direction and purpose by affirming what was always somehow already there. The question that came to occupy Heidegger and Schürmann that day was not the mystical question Eckhart invites us to experience, but the question concerning whether “the saying of ‘thou’ is part and parcel of the being of *Dasein*.”²³ Schürmann found it difficult to convey in writing the living experience of the thou. As Buber recognized, “the real and filled present exists only in so far as actual presentness [*Gegenwärtigkeit*], meeting, and relation exist. Only there, where the *Thou* becomes present, does the present exist.”²⁴ Schürmann’s inability to convey in writing the depth of his encounter with Heidegger is itself eloquent testimony to the way genuine encounters dissolve upon reflection. And yet, even so, Schürmann captures something of its signature when he relates that “the outcome of this part of the conversation, the longest and most interesting (and of which he himself said that in it we touched on something profound), was quite remarkable.”²⁵ When the “thou” becomes present between teacher and student and the two attend resolutely to what comes to presence between them, it can shape the course of a life.

Heidegger insisted during his encounter with Schürmann that day that the experience of the “thou” goes beyond the “*es*” of “*es gibt Sein*,” “there is being.”²⁶ Schürmann conveys it this way:

The experience is no longer one of thought alone, but of all of oneself (those are still his own words). In this sense, philosophy does not speak about that experience. It does, however, open the paths on which such an experience might become real.²⁷

Schürmann taught us that an experience with the “thou” does not only unfold between human beings, but it can also arise between us and the texts we encounter. In a deep philosophical sense, we had all come to Schürmann to learn how to read

in ways that empower texts to interpret us, to shape our lives. This, of course, is also what he was modeling for us during that final course on *Being and Time* in the spring of 1993. In his essay, *Symbolic Difference*, Schürmann writes:

The interpreted word wishes to develop possibilities of being which were latent in me. It creates reality. . . . The word 'reality' thus designates much more than the totality of the objects which come into our hand, *res*. If it is understood from interpretative existence, the concept of reality becomes temporalized: the future as that which is possible, not yet in hand, determines us as much as 'facts,' present or past. The fact is mute, but reality tells me something about myself: it is a category of language. That which speaks to me is real. Language alone frees reality.²⁸

Schürmann spoke to us that semester, and in so speaking, allowed the text to speak to us as well, to free a reality for each of us, to set us upon a path. Schürmann concludes his account of his encounter with Heidegger on the question of the "thou" as endemic to the being of Dasein with these words: "philosophy's role is to open the way by which an unutterable experience may be given, but such an experience would no longer be answerable to philosophy; it would be the prerogative of the one to whom it was granted."²⁹

And yet, this is an impoverished vision of philosophy, one that presumes what Schürmann himself never would: that the activities of thinking can be segregated from the practices of living. Schürmann taught us that such a segregation was not possible, that thinking and acting are intimately intertwined, and that they come to life in language and through the ways we respond to what comes to presence.

In this, we are returned to the final passages on which Schürmann focused during his final lecture. He had called our attention to section 65 of *Being and Time*, "Temporality as the Ontological Sense of Care," and specifically, in the end, to the question of presencing. Here we find this passage:

Only as the present (*Gegenwart*) in the sense of presencing (*Gegenwärtigens*) can resoluteness be what it is: the undisguised letting what it apprehends in action be encountered.³⁰

The final passage on which that final session ended was itself a call to let what comes to presence in action be. In calling our attention to this text and allowing it to continue even now to speak to us, Schürmann eloquently encourages us—and perhaps in so doing took heart himself—to be resolute in the wake of what we were encountering there in action, the dying of a beloved teacher.

In this, Schürmann was genuinely Socratic; for Phaedo articulates how Socrates, in anticipating his own death, heartened those friends who had gathered in his cell on that final, fateful day by responding gracefully to the unsettling crisis to which their argument had come. The arguments that had begun with Simmias laughing had, by the middle of the dialogue, come to a point of crisis as

those gathered began to realize that perhaps like the body, the soul “altogether perishes.”³¹ Here, however, Phaedo breaks off his re-enactment of what was said in Socrates’ cell that day to reflect upon his experience by speaking in the first person directly to Echecrates about the impact Socrates had on those present. Phaedo says that he had often wondered at Socrates, but never more than at that moment, as Socrates responded to his unsettled and disheartened friends.

What I especially wondered at him for was first this: how *pleasantly* and *kindly* and *admirably* he received the argument (*logon*) of the young men, but then also how *acutely* he perceived what we had suffered from the words, and then how *well* he healed us and, as if he called back those fleeing and defeated, he urged us to follow close along with him and examine the account (*logon*).³²

Schürmann, like Socrates, always urged us to follow close along with him in examining the *logos*. So too, in that last lecture, he healed us well by directing us back to the text where we encounter the question of being and how we might cultivate practices of authentic care and devote our lives to the practice of philosophy as care of death.

If, as Heidegger suggests, “Care is being-toward-death,” then it also involves being attuned to the moment in an intentional way.³³ In *Being and Time*, Heidegger calls this *Entschlossenheit*, resoluteness. Thus, his text tells us: “Resolute, Dasein has brought itself back out of entanglement [*aus dem Verfallen*] in order all the more authentically to be ‘there’ in the moment [*Augenblick*] for the disclosed situation.”³⁴ To be resolutely there in the moment requires habits of thinking and acting that enable us to tarry authentically with what discloses itself between us.

If, as Schürmann suggests, “Symbols effect the translation of discourse into a course, a path,” then those of us who had come to Schürmann to learn how to read were invited to attend carefully to what comes to presence in the texts we interpret and to chart a course of life, resolute and authentic, attuned always to what comes to presence in the moment of encounter. This, ultimately, was the lesson Schürmann had to teach that day, and it is one that continues to animate the lives of those who encountered him.

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NOTES

1. Plato, *Platonis Opera*, Scriptorum Classicorum Bibliotheca Oxoniensis (Oxonii: E Typographeo Clarendoniano; New York: Oxford University Press, 1900), Phaedo, 64a5–7. For the translations found here, see *Plato: Phaedo*, trans. Eva Brann, Peter

- Kalkavage, and Eric Salem (Newburyport, MA: Focus Publishing/R. Pullins Company, 1998).
2. *Phaedo*, 67e4–5.
 3. For a reading of the *Phaedo* as a performative text, see Christopher P. Long, *Socratic and Platonic Political Philosophy: Practicing a Politics of Reading* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014).
 4. Reiner Schürmann, “Symbolic Difference,” *Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal* 19/20(2/1) (1997): 27.
 5. *Ibid.*, 28.
 6. Martin Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit* (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1986), 142–43. In §31, Heidegger writes: “Attunement is one of the existential structures in which the being of the ‘there’ dwells. Equi-originally with it, *understanding* constitutes this being. Attunement has always its understanding, even if only by suppressing it. Understanding is always attuned.” Regarding the incompleteness of *Being and Time*, the existential analytic of Dasein pursued in the text deepens our understanding of the temporality of Dasein; but *Being and Time* was not able to develop an account of Being itself as time. This it would take Heidegger a lifetime to pursue.
 7. Schürmann was always careful to differentiate the Heideggerian “existentialia” from Aristotelian or Kantian categories. He called them “peculiar categories,” neither related to the subject, as in Kant, nor to an ousiology, as in Aristotle, and yet, they are designed to render an a priori understanding of being explicit. See Christopher P. Long, “Notes on Reiner Schürmann’s Spring 1993 Being and Time Lecture Course” (Lecture Notes, New York, NY, Spring 1993), February 17.
 8. Schürmann began the lectures with an account of the unity of Heidegger’s writings, arguing against the tendency, which had currency at the time, to separate the early from the late Heidegger. William Richardson introduced this idea in his 1963 interpretation of Heidegger, and Schürmann sought to undermine it by reminding us that the question of Being with which *Being and Time* opens remained the question of Heidegger’s thinking throughout. In the first session of the lecture, Schürmann insisted: “It is important to understand clearly that in *Being and Time* Heidegger is preoccupied with the question of Being as such—whatever that will turn out to mean—and only therefore with the question of Dasein. This is important, among other things, for the unity of Heidegger’s writings.” He emphasized the introduction in detail at the beginning of the semester because, as he put it: “these first forty pages are proof that Heidegger’s work is a unity, that there are not ‘two Heidegger’s’ [sic].” See Reiner Schürmann, “PHIL0261 Heidegger’s Being and Time” (Lecture Notes, New York, NY, Spring 1993), 2, Raymond Fogelman Library. For a more detailed account of Schürmann’s approach to reading Heidegger holistically, see Reiner Schürmann, “How to Read Heidegger,” *Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal* 19/20(2/1) (1997): 3–8. In the opening lecture of the course, Schürmann was referring to William J. Richardson, *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought* (The Hague: Martinus Hijhoff, 1963).
 9. Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, 66–72.
 10. See Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit* §26.
 11. Long, “Notes on Schürmann’s Being and Time,” March 3. See, too, Schürmann, “Heidegger’s Being and Time,” 22–24.

Care of Death: On the Teaching of Reiner Schürmann

12. Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, 250–52.
13. Schürmann, “Heidegger’s Being and Time,” 25.
14. Schürmann used to write “ek-stasis” on the board to emphasize the manner in which Dasein transcends itself in its very being. He would always point to the hyphen as the way to signify this, and thus would sometimes write: Da-sein. In his written notes, we find him writing: “Projection is possible only on the grounds of futurity. . . . Thus, futurity lies at the bottom of ec-sistence, care, Being-in-the-world, trans-cending, pro-jection.” Schürmann lecture notes, 3. Temporality, c) Temporality as the ‘Sense’ of Care: the Three ‘Ecstasies.’
15. Schürmann, “Heidegger’s Being and Time,” 25.
16. See Martin Heidegger, *On Time and Being* (New York: Harper and Row, 1972).
17. Long, “Notes on Schürmann’s Being and Time,” April 14.
18. In the lecture, Schürmann spoke of the pull of death as the ontological condition for the possibility of past and present. I am not convinced this is the best way to formulate it since it renders being-toward-death as a kind of transcendental condition for the possibility of existential time. Here too, we encounter another limit of *Being and Time*, which, in unfolding the question of the being of Dasein from the perspective of death, failed to provide a rich enough account of natality as itself a condition for the possibility of existence. In *Broken Hegemonies*, Schürmann redresses this to some degree by identifying natality and mortality as the two irreducible ultimates that condition human life. See, for example, Reiner Schürmann, *Broken Hegemonies* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2003), 23. For a more detailed discussion of natality and mortality in Schürmann, see Christopher P. Long, “The Voice of Singularity and a Philosophy to Come: Schürmann, Kant and the Pathology of Being,” *Philosophy Today* 53, Supplement (2009): 138–50.
19. Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, 327.
20. Reiner Schürmann, “Reiner Schürmann’s Report of His Visit to Martin Heidegger,” trans. Pierre Adler, *Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal* 19/20(2/1) (1997): 68.
21. *Ibid.*, 69.
22. *Ibid.*
23. *Ibid.*, 70.
24. Martin Buber, *Ich und Du* (Heidelberg: Verlag Lambert Schneider, 1983), 19.
25. Schürmann, “Reiner Schürmann’s Report of His Visit to Martin Heidegger,” 70.
26. *Ibid.*
27. *Ibid.*
28. Schürmann, “Symbolic Difference,” 28.
29. Schürmann, “Reiner Schürmann’s Report of His Visit to Martin Heidegger,” 71.
30. Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, 326.
31. *Phaedo*, 88b9.
32. *Phaedo*, 89a1–7. For a discussion of this passage and a broader reading of the *Phaedo*, see Long, *Socratic and Platonic Political Philosophy*, 66–97.
33. Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, 329.
34. *Ibid.*, 328.